A Quick Shake of The Bottle

You sometimes have to shake a bottle to see what’s inside. In 2006, Israeli warplanes struck at Lebanese infrastructure. Suddenly there were stories of Chinese construction companies packing up and leaving Lebanon, and it was only then did it become obvious how many were operating in the country.

Much the same is true today. The recent unrest in China’s western provinces has underscored the extent of China’s presence in North Africa.

There are 20,000 Chinese nationals in Algeria alone, not to mention Libya and Morocco. Their numbers hadn’t attracted much attention until last week when local extremists threatened to target them with reprisals. The Chinese Embassy in Algeria went so far as to issue a warning to its nationals.

The events underscore an important point about China’s engagement with the Middle East―you won’t always read about it on the front pages of the Financial Times or New York Times. But that doesn’t mean it isn’t happening. And a quick shake of the bottle can produce often unexpected results.

In North Africa, the Chinese are mainly helping to build the region’s infrastructure. Flush with petrodollars, Algeria and Libya, in particular, are employing Chinese construction companies to build airports, residential blocks, and power plants, to name just a few of the projects underway.

The China State Engineering Construction Company is at the vanguard. It employs 9,000 Chinese in Algeria alone. The company is even constructing offices for the Algerian Foreign Ministry. I find this most remarkable. After all, a foreign ministry ranks among a country’s most sensitive political institutions.

It helps that China offered a $30 million concessionary loan to Algeria’s government to fund the building’s construction. This may have pacified critics and helped see off any competition from local companies. But it only underscores China’s growing commercial and political clout in the region.

Neither is it only large state-owned enterprises that are operating in the North Africa. I recently spoke with a Moroccan journalist in Beijing who cited growing numbers of Chinese traders selling goods in Morocco’s major cities. The Chinese call this type of activity tao jin, or digging for gold.

A few are even opening up businesses. Take the example of Xiao Fan, a native of Shandong province, who has set up a Chinese restaurant in the city of Rabat. He lacks either a residency or business permit, but he still turns a tidy profit. He even claims to have hosted some of Morocco’s royal family.

It is too easy to say that policy-makers in Beijing’s Zhongnanhai are responsible for China’s push into North Africa. The China State Engineering Construction Company is certainly a mainly state-owned company. But stories like that of Xiao Fan show how entrepreneurs are equally driving the change.

Yet even as commercial links are being stress tested, so are political links.

Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s criticism of the unrest in China’s western provinces grabbed the spotlight. He was taken seriously enough for Beijing to send a top envoy to the country. But Erdogan was also an exception. And the Middle East’s media, from Riyadh to Rabat, largely ignored the event.

It has hard to exaggerate the importance of this response, or lack of, from the region. So far, China has dealt with the Middle East on the basis of commercial interests, rather than political interests. It has adroitly side-stepped the political bear-traps that lie in places like Palestine and Lebanon.

Nonetheless, whether this will remain possible in the future is unclear. Indeed, North Africa might yet prove a stumbling block.

How so? First, China’s presence in North Africa is greater than it is in the rest of the Middle East. You won’t find the same number of Chinese in Damascus as you will Rabat. Second, North Africa’s politics are more international than they are in the rest of Africa owing to the country’s majority Muslim population.

In short, the events of the past week have revealed a new aspect to China’s ties to North Africa and, indeed, the wider Middle East. It isn’t yet clear what the implications are for all sides. But we certainly know a little more about the strength and weakness of the relationship than we did a month ago.